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Midterm Elections Used to Gauge President’s Reelection Chances
--Desmond Wallace--

Desmond Wallace is currently studying at Coastal Carolina University for a Bachelor’s degree in
both political science and history with a minor in pre-law, and will graduate in Spring 2013. He
plans to attend graduate school and pursue a Master’s degree in Applied Politics. He will begin
serving as a research assistant to Dr. Holley Tankersley in Fall 2012.

ABSTRACT
Since 1952 there have been thirteen instances in which the incumbent president’s party lost seats
in the House of Representatives in a midterm election. Researchers have created two competing
theories to explain this trend. The surge-and-decline theory argues that the reasons for causing
high voter turnout in a presidential election are absent in a midterm election, leading to a
decline in voter turnout and subsequent losses by the president’s party. The other theory, the
referendum theory, argues that losses suffered by the president’s party are due to the president’s
performance and the performance of the economy. When it comes to presidential elections, out
of the thirteen midterm election losses, the incumbent party was able to retain the White House
in the subsequent presidential election six times. The other six times, the incumbent party lost
the White House. However, there is little to no research explaining why this is the case. This
article attempts to answer two questions. First, can results of midterm elections serve as an
indicator of gauging a president’s reelection chances? Second, if so, which theory, surge-anddecline or referendum, helps explain this trend this best? Utilizing statistical analysis, my
research shows that there is insufficient evidence to conclude whether midterm elections can
serve as an indicator of gauging a president’s reelection chances.
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Introduction
There have been fifteen presidential elections and fifteen midterm elections since 1952. During
this time, it has been the case that the president’s party loses seats in a midterm election. Out of
those fifteen midterm elections, there have been thirteen elections in which the political party of
the incumbent president lost seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and two elections where
the incumbent president’s party gained seats. Of the fifteen presidential elections, there have
been seven instances where the incumbent president’s party lost seats in the previous midterm
election, but won the subsequent presidential election, and seven instances of the opposite.
Conventional analysis of midterm elections is usually in relation to the previous presidential
election, or the issues or events leading up towards a presidential election. Rarely are midterm
elections considered in terms of whether the president, or his party in some cases, would retain
the White House in the next presidential election. The focus of this research is to determine
whether midterm elections can serve as a predictive indicator of the outcome in the following
presidential election. For decades, scholars have speculated as to why the president’s party
suffers losses at the midterm election. An examination of these theories can provide insight into
the variables that should be considered when examining the central question of this research.
Competing Theories of Midterm Elections
Coattails and Surge-and-Decline Theory
When it comes to midterm elections, there exist two prominent theories that help explain why the
president’s party suffers losses. The first theory is the “coattails theory.” According to this
theory, first proposed by Bean (1948), the losses suffered by the president’s party are a result of
the decline in voter turnout for midterm elections. The voters that voted in the presidential
election because of a specific candidate are less likely to vote in the off-year election; thus,
congressional candidates from the president’s party are likely to suffer defeat in the absence of
presidential coattails (Press, 1956).
Building on the coattails theory is the surge-and-decline theory. According to Campbell (1960),
a high-stimulus election, an election in which issues, events or popular candidates may stimulate
widespread enthusiasm and interest amongst the electorate, is usually followed by a low-stimulus
election, an election in which issues or events do not stimulate interest and enthusiasm amongst
the electorate for the election. If there is enough interest, in any given election, voters who may
not usually vote (or voters with weak party identification) tend to vote for one party over the
other. However, if the election does not seem to be important enough, only the typical, dedicated
voters will vote. Displayed in Figure 1 are the major premises of Campbell’s theory.
In order to test his theory, Campbell focused on patterns and trends in voter turnout and
partisanship. Campbell referred to two panel studies conducted by the Survey Research Center;
the first study was of participants’ choices in the presidential election in 1952 and in the previous
election. In 1956 and 1958, the Survey Research Center conducted a second survey, asking the
participants about their vote choices in both of these elections. These two national surveys
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revealed three interesting findings. First, Campbell classifies the 1952 presidential election as a
surge election, due to an increase in voter turnout and a swing in partisanship that resulted in
Dwight Eisenhower receiving more votes than Thomas Dewey. Second, Campbell classifies the
1956-1958 election cycles as an electoral decline due to less political party activity and media
coverage than in typical presidential elections. Finally, he notes a major swing in partisanship in
favor of Democrats as opposed to the swing from 1952.
Referendum Theory
In response to the original surge-and-decline theory, Tufte (1975) tries to explain why it is the
case the president’s party loses the number of seats as it does. Whereas surge-and-decline is
focused mainly on voter turnout and the amount of interest and information that is present in the
election, Tufte focuses on two additional, yet equally important, factors: presidential popularity
(Kernell, 1977; Piereson, 1975) and national economic performance (Kramer, 1971; Stigler
1973). The reconstruction of Tufte’s referendum model is Figure 2.
Using data from 1938 to 1970, Tufte (1975) examines his hypothesis through multiple regression
analysis, using the following equation:
Vote Loss by President’s Party in Midterm = β0 + β1 [Presidential Popularity]
+ ß2 [Yearly Change in Economic Conditions] + ε
Based on his findings, Tufte concluded that all of the midterm elections of 1938 to 1970 were in
fact a referendum on the president based on his performance and the management of the national
economy. Tufte based this argument on his finding that the two independent variables—the
president’s approval rating and the yearly change in real disposable personal income per capita—
explained approximately 91% of the variation in midterm election results. According to Tufte, a
10 percentage point change in the president’s Gallup approval rating equates to a 1.3 percentage
point change in the national midterm congressional vote of the president’s party. Tufte also
found that a change of $100 in real disposable income in the year prior to the election equated to
a 3.5 percentage point change in the national midterm congressional vote of the president’s party.
Tufte followed-up on his research in his 1978 book, Political Control of the Economy. He
shifted the period he was studying and started with the 1946 midterm election and concluded
with the 1974 midterm election. He then found that a 1 percentage point change in the growth of
real disposable income per capita the year prior to the election equates to a 0.6 percentage point
change in the president’s party’s national congressional vote. Also, a 10 percentage point change
in the president’s Gallup approval poll equates to a 1.3 percentage point change in the president’s
party’s national congressional vote, which was the same as when Tufte conducted this research
in 1975. Tufte’s results led to a shift in scholars’ consideration of how the president’s party loses
midterm congressional races. This shift in focus to referendum-type voting deflated the
importance of the surge-and-decline theory.
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Restoration and Revision of Surge-and-Decline
In the late 1980s, there was an attempt to resurrect the surge and decline theory. J. E. Campbell
issued a revised version in 1987, refined the model in 1991, and refined the model once more in
1997. According to Campbell (1987), the difference between his theory and A. Campbell’s
(1960) original theory is that, unlike the original theory, turnout of peripheral partisans and the
voting choice of independents will be affected due to a surge in both interest and information.
Listed in Figure 3 is a summary of the differences between the two theories.
Campbell’s (1987) revised theory makes the claim that the number of partisans present in the
electorate for the presidential election and a presidential candidate’s share of the independent
vote is directly proportional to the magnitude of the short-term forces that favors the president’s
party. Campbell utilizes linear regression analysis to prove his theory, examining the
relationship between congressional vote choice and party identification, turnout, and the
president’s share of the popular vote in the previous midterm election between the years 1956
and 1982.
Campbell (1987) concluded that there was a surge effect in the number of partisan voters that
turned out and a surge effect for information present during the presidential election; these surge
effects are not present in midterm elections. In 1991, Campbell issued a revision to his version
of the surge-and-decline. This time, he expanded his time series to examine thirty-one
presidential elections and thirty midterm elections between the years 1868 and 1988. For the
purposes of this revision, Campbell looked at the relationship between electoral change and the
president’s popular vote share, controlling for a number of factors, including whether the
election year was a presidential year or a midterm year. Campbell concluded that although his
findings weakened over a large period, surge-and-decline effects were still present.
Campbell (1997) outlines his completed revision of surge-and-decline in his book The
Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections. The major elements of Campbell’s revised theory
are outlined in Figure 4. Here Campbell explains that his theory, unlike the original surge-anddecline theory, takes into account Tufte’s idea that the midterm election acts as a referendum on
the president’s party. Campbell’s revised theory also takes into account Kernell and Jacobson’s
(1983) theory of the strategic politician. Campbell (1997) concludes that the short-term forces
affecting the presidential election, other than affecting the decisions of the electorate, has the
potential for affecting congressional candidates decisions. This includes whether an incumbent
decides to seek reelection or retire, a challenger decides to declare their candidacy or a party
decides to run a candidate at all.
Using Midterm Election Theories to Predict Subsequent Presidential Elections
Although these two schools of thought attempt to explain why the president’s party would suffer
losses in the midterm election following his own election, scholars have yet to apply these
theories to the question of whether midterm elections could be a predictive indicator of
subsequent presidential elections. Voter turnout and enthusiasm, presidential performance,
economic performance and all of the other variables that comprise these two theories are not
only important in terms of the first two years of the president’s term in office, but they also

Bridges, No. 6, Spring 2012

94

factor greatly in the second half of the term as well. Thus, there is a clear link between midterm
and presidential elections.
However, it is likely that any causal relationship between midterm elections and subsequent
presidential elections is less clear because there are so many factors that affect the outcome of
presidential elections. These factors include, but are not limited to, policy issues, candidate
favorability and political ideology. When it comes to predicting presidential elections, there is a
consensus among scholars that there are two main factors to consider at the time of the election:
the popularity of the incumbent president and the state of the economy. In regards to the
economy, Fair (1978) concluded that the economy, in terms of real economic activity, i.e.,
change in Gross National Product (GNP) or change in the unemployment rate, affects the voting
on presidential elections. A similar finding came from Erikson (1989), although his measure of
economic activity was per capita disposable income.
In regards to presidential popularity, some scholars have argued that the incumbent president’s
approval rating had nothing to do with his reelection chances (Mueller, 1973). Others have
disagreed by showing evidence of a positive correlation between the president’s approval rating
in the last poll prior to the election and the actual vote share the president received (Sigelman,
1979). Scholars have also incorporated presidential popularity to predict the vote share of the
presidential candidate of the incumbent party, who is not the incumbent president himself (Brody
& Sigelman, 1983). Thus, presidential popularity and the economy are common variables to
predict the president’s, and his party’s, chances of retaining the White House.
Most scholars use the Tufte model, focusing on presidential popularity and the state of the
economy, when creating their own presidential models. The only difference is that whereas
Tufte uses real disposable income per capita as the economic indicator, presidential election
models use GNP (Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1984; Abramowitz, 1988), Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), inflation (Moghaddam & Elich, 2009) or any combination of these three variables to
represent the state of the economy.
Although there is little research supporting the idea that midterm elections affect subsequent
presidential elections, I contend that there is an effect. The reason for this is that two things
happen at the conclusion of a midterm election: the incumbent president reacts to the results,
whether it is through a change in policy or personnel, and at the next presidential election, there
is a surge in voter turnout.
Two important questions create the focus of this article. The first question asks if the theories
used to explain midterm election results are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential
elections. If it is the case that these theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential
elections, then the second question is which theory, surge-and-decline or referendum, is the most
applicable for predicting subsequent presidential elections. It is my contention that midterm
election theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential elections and that Tufte’s
referendum model, or a variation of it, is the most applicable for predicting subsequent
presidential elections.
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Data and Methodology
In order to test my theory and hypothesis, I estimate three models. The first two models
approximate the midterm surge-and-decline and referendum theories. The third model is a test
of my own theory that the results of the previous midterm elections influence subsequent
presidential elections.
Data from sixteen presidential and midterm elections (1948 to 2010) comprises the research.
The data does not expand to pre-1948 due to the limited availability of certain variables. For
example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis only has quarterly data regarding personal disposable
income as far back as 1947, and Gallup has data on its presidential job approval poll as far back
as 1937.
The first variable of interest is the number of House of Representatives seats lost or gained by
the president’s party in each election calculated as the difference between the number of seats
held or won during one election, and the number of seats held or won during the next election.
Out of the sixteen midterm election years examined, House seat gains and losses range from a
loss of sixty-three seats in 2010 to a gain of eight seats in 2002. This variable will serve as the
dependent variable for the midterm election models and as the main independent variable for my
presidential election model.
The second variable is simply whether or not the president was reelected (or his party retained
control of the White House). This binary variable serves as the dependent variable in the
presidential election model; it is coded zero for instances in which the president lost his
reelection bid (or his party lost control of the White House) and one for instances in which the
President was successfully reelected (or his party successfully retained control of the White
House). Out of the sixteen presidential election years covered, there are eight instances where
the president won reelection, or his party maintained control of the White House, and eight
instances where the President lost reelection, or his party lost control of the White House.
In order to measure the direction and magnitude of the presidential surge (Campbell, 1987), I use
the share of the popular vote received by the winning candidate in each presidential election. It
is also the independent variable of primary focus to surge and decline supporters (Campbell,
1985). Over the course of the past sixteen presidential elections, the president’s share of the
popular vote ranged from 43% in 1992 to 61.1% in 1964.
Another variable measured is the president’s approval rating prior to each election. This data
comes from Gallup with the last poll taken prior to the election ranging from September to
October; the president’s approval rating over the course of this data series ranges from 25% in
2008 to 74% in 1964. This variable is one of the main independent variables in Tufte’s
referendum model (1975).
I examine two variables that measure economic health. The first is the percent change in total
disposable income per capita (adjusted for inflation) calculated from Bureau of Economic
Analysis data. Whereas Tufte’s original model utilized the percent change in total disposable
income for the year prior to the election, this research utilizes the percent change in total
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disposable income for the year the election occurred. The reason for this is the election year’s
percent change in disposable income is a more contemporary measure to use instead of the
percent change from the previous year. The percent change of total disposable income during
election years range from -2.6% in 1980 to 7.5% in 1950.
The second income variable examined is how confident consumers are about the state of the
current economy, via the current index with the index normalized to have a value of one hundred
in December 1964. The data representing this variable covers years 1951 to 2010 with an
election low of 70.4 in 1952 to an election high of 113.0 in 1998. (For years 1951 to 1959, the
most recent index number prior to the election is used. From 1960 onwards, the average of the
July, August and September indices is used). This variable is included in the referendum model,
to represent voters’ ideas about the economy.
I also include a dummy variable representing the incumbent president’s political party. A zero
represents the Republican Party, and a one represents the Democratic Party. This variable is
included in the midterm election models to examine whether incumbent presidents of one party
tend to lose more seats in the midterm election then presidents of the other party.
For the purposes of this research, I will construct a model to show that midterm elections are a
predictive indicator for presidential elections. This model illustrates the question: which of the
two theories, surge-and-decline or referendum, is a better predictive model for midterm
elections? Can midterm election results serve as an indicator in predicting the president’s
reelection chances? The hypothesis born from this model is that the results of a midterm
election, in conjunction with intervening factors, can serve as a predictive gauge as to whether
the incumbent president will win reelection.
I incorporated regression analysis to examine the relationships between these variables. Linear
regression is used to examine the relationship between House gains/losses and the president’s
popular vote percentage, president’s approval rating prior to the midterm and percent change in
total disposable income. In order to maintain consistency, both the surge-and-decline and
referendum models are comprised of data from 1954 to 2010. Logistic regression is used to
examine the relationship between whether or not the president is reelected and the results of the
previous midterm election. Table 1 outlines the different models analyzed, the variables
included, and the type of regression applied to each model.
Results
Surge-and-Decline Model
This model examines the relationship between the number of House seats gained or lost by the
president’s party in the midterm election and the president’s performance in the previous
presidential election. This model has an R-value of 0.384, representing a weak correlation
between the number of House seats lost or gained by the president’s party, and the president’s
performance in the previous presidential election and party identification. This model also has
an R-square value of 0.231, meaning that this model only explains approximately 23% of the
variance between the dependent variable and the independent variables.
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The constant, the predicted value of number of House seats gained when the other variables
equal zero, has a value of 49.912. This means that assuming the independent variables were
zero, the president’s party would gain approximately 49 to 50 House seats. The variable
representing the president’s popular vote percentage in the previous presidential election has a
coefficient value of -132.458, meaning that assuming the other variables remain constant the
president’s party will lose approximately 132 to 133 House seats for every one percentage point
increase in the president’s popular vote. The variable representing the president’s political party
has a coefficient value of -12.359, meaning that assuming the other variables remain constant,
for every unit increase in political party there will be a 12.359 decrease in the number of House
seats gained. Because this variable was coded zero for Democrats and one for Republicans, the
Republicans will lose approximately 12 to 13 more seats in midterm elections than Democrats
will. The regression equation representing this model of the surge-and-decline theory is
represented as:
Number of House Seats Gained = 49.912 – 12.359 [Party]
– 132.458 [President’s Share of Popular Vote] + ε
In order for the variables to be considered statistically significant, or significantly different from
zero, their p-values have to be below 0.05. In this model, neither of the two variables’ p-value
was below 0.05. The variable representing the president’s popular vote percentage has a p-value
of 0.252, and the variable representing the president’s party has a p-value of 0.329. In addition,
the constant is also not statistically significant as its p-value is 0.414.
Referendum Model
This model examines the relationship between the number of House seats gained or lost by the
president’s party in the midterm election, and the president’s performance during the time
between the presidential election and the midterm election. This model has an R-value of 0.876,
representing a very strong correlation between the president’s performance in office and the
results of the midterm election. This model also has an R-square value of 0.768, meaning that
this model explains approximately 77% of the variance between the dependent variable and the
independent variables.
The constant has a value of -120.888, meaning the president’s party would lose approximately
120 to 121 House seats if the independent variables equaled zero. The variable representing the
president’s approval rating has a coefficient value of 153.351, meaning that assuming the other
variables remain constant, the president’s party will gain approximately 154 House seats for
every percentage point increase in the president’s approval rating. The variable representing the
yearly percent change in personal disposable income has a coefficient value of 7.412. Assuming
the other variables remain constant, for every percentage point increase in personal disposable
income, the president’s party will gain approximately seven to eight House seats. The variable
representing consumer’s confidence in the economy has a coefficient value of 0.120. This means
that for every unit increase in consumer confidence, the president’s party will gain at most one
additional House seat, assuming the other variables remain constant. The variable representing
the president’s political party has a coefficient value of -21.114. Because this variable was
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coded the same way as in the surge-and-decline model, Republicans are expected to lose
approximately 21 to 22 House seats more than Democrats, assuming the other variables remain
constant. The regression equation representing this model of the referendum theory is
represented as:
Number of House Seats Gained = –120.88 – 21.114 [Party] + 153.351 [President’s Approval
Rating] + 7.412 [Yearly Percent Change in Personal Disposable Income]
+ 0.120 [Consumer Confidence] + ε
With the exception of the variable representing consumer confidence, the other independent
variables have a p-value less than 0.05. President’s approval rating has a p-value of 0.004,
percent change in disposable income has a p-value of 0.030, and the president’s party has a pvalue of 0.029. Therefore, these three variables are statistically significant from zero. The
constant is also statistically significant with a p-value of 0.004. The variable representing
consumer confidence has a p-value of 0.761. Although this variable is not considered
statistically significant, it is still an important variable when considering how the economy
factors into midterm elections.
Based on these results, it is apparent that for the period 1954 to 2010, the referendum theory is a
better explainer of why the president’s party loses U.S. House seats in the midterm election than
the surge-and-decline theory. However, just because one theory is better at explaining why
incumbent presidents suffer midterm losses, does not necessarily mean said theory also explains
why some presidents, and their party, are successful at retaining the White House in the next
presidential election, while others fail. Therefore, I will construct my presidential model
utilizing the following process:




Model #1 will incorporate the number of House seats gained or lost by the president’s
party only.
Model #2 will incorporate the number of House seats gained or lost by the president’s
party and the variables representing the surge-and-decline theory.
Model #3 will incorporate the number of House seats gained or lost by the president’s
party and the variables representing the referendum theory.

Presidential Election Model
In order to incorporate the midterm theories into the presidential model accurately, I made
several changes to the midterm models. First, I lagged the variable representing the president’s
popular vote by four years, to represent the incumbent president’s popular vote in the previous
presidential election. Second, I lagged the variable representing the number of House seats
gained or lost by the president’s party by two years to represent the incumbent party’s
performance in the previous midterm election. Third, the variable representing consumers’
confidence in the economy is represented as the average of the values of the index taken the year
prior to the presidential election. The variables representing both the president’s approval rating
and the yearly percent change in total disposable income are the only variables not changed.
After running all three models of my theory, there were no models where the variables reached
statistical significance. The first model in which the variable representing House seats gained
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was the closest to statistical significance. This variable was the only one included and had a
coefficient value of 0.032. This means that for every House seat gained by the president’s party,
the chances the incumbent president, or his party, retaining the White House increase by 65.7%.
The constant has a value of 0.561, meaning that assuming the president’s party did not gain any
seats, the chances of the incumbent president retaining the White House increase by 63.7%. The
equation representing this model is represented as:
Incumbent President Reelected = e0.561 + 0.032 [House Seats Gained by President’s Party] /
1 + e0.561 + 0.032 [House Seats Gained by Presidents’ Party]
The results generated are most likely due to the small sample size I had to work with. In order
for logistic regression to work, there has to be a relatively large sample size of data. There is
debate among statisticians as to how many cases are needed in order for the sample size to be
considered large. If a normal logistic regression model were applied to a small sample size, then
the results would reflect over-fitting. If this is the case, then the only remedy is results from
future elections.
Based on the results of my presidential models, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
midterm election results have an impact on the incumbent president’s reelection chances. There
is also insufficient evidence to conclude that either the surge-and-decline theory or the
referendum theory is applicable in explaining presidential reelection success or failure. This
leads to the following question: if these theories are not applicable to predict presidential
elections, then what factors need consideration when predicting presidential elections?
Evaluating the Theories
Surge-and-Decline Theory
The president’s share of the popular vote is the foundation of the surge-and-decline theory.
When evaluating this theory in terms of predicting midterm elections, no statistically significant
relationship exists between the president’s share of the popular vote and the number of U.S.
House seats his party will lose or gain in the next midterm election. Compared with the
referendum theory, surge-and-decline holds a unique advantage. Whereas the referendum theory
is limited in the number of elections examined due to limited data availability, surge-and-decline
is not limited. This allows me to expand the period and include cases prior to 1936. Thus, I ran
another model similar to the one run earlier representing the surge-and-decline theory. The
expectation is that if more cases are included, then the results of this model will be an
improvement over the model run earlier. The model remains the same as the one tested earlier;
however, this model includes midterm elections from 1862 to 1934. After running this model,
the results were as follows. In terms of the actual equation, the adjusted R-square value was 0.015, and its p-value was 0.487. The variable representing the president’s percentage of the
popular vote in the presidential election had a coefficient value of -81.750 and a p-value of
0.391. The variable representing political party had a coefficient value of -9.700 and a p-value
of 0.349. Compared with the earlier model, this model is a worse representative of surge-anddecline. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the surge-and-decline theory does not
fit the overall trend of the president’s party losing congressional seats in midterm elections.
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The underlying principle behind the theory of surge-and-decline is that certain forces present in a
presidential election are absent in a midterm election, which results in lower turnout and a loss of
congressional seats for the president’s party. However, I fail to see the reason as to why the
president’s share of the popular vote from his election is comparable to the number of seats his
party gains or loses in the subsequent midterm election (Campbell, 1991). Studying the
relationship between presidential popular vote and midterm losses undertakes the assumption
that the president’s popular vote would be the same in the midterm election as it was in the
previous presidential election. This is not the case, however. Instead, the moving parts that
resulted in the president’s victory begin to shift again at about the same time the president takes
office and begins to make decisions. Because the president is on the ballot every four years,
there has to be a method in place to gauge the public’s attitude towards the president, thus
explaining the role of the presidential approval poll, one of the underpinnings of the referendum
theory.
Based on the results presented in this research, and taking into account the error of evaluating the
president’s popular vote, it is said with confidence that the theory of surge-and-decline is not the
best theory to explain presidential midterm losses.
Referendum Theory
Although the period of the referendum theory is limited due to unavailability of data regarding
president’s approval rating and requisite economic data, it is still a better explainer than the
surge-and-decline theory as to why the president’s party loses congressional seats. The
president’s approval rating is, according to the data, the strongest variable available to predict
whether the president’s party will lose or gain seats.
There has been numerous literature published on the role of the economy in elections (Kramer,
1971; Stigler, 1973; Tufte, 1975). On its own, the annual percent change of total disposable
income per capita for the election year is not a statistically significant variable. However, when
the consumer confidence index for the third quarter of the election year is included, then the
percent change variable becomes statistically significant. Nevertheless, the p-value for the
variable representing consumer confidence never reaches the 0.05 threshold. Regardless, the
inclusion of this variable in the overall equation is necessary. This is because the economy is
considered as an intervening variable; it has an effect on both the president’s approval rating and
the results of the election.
The role of the economy in Tufte’s referendum model is transposable onto elections in general.
The economy plays a role in both the midterm election and the presidential election. Each one of
these components is a leg in the “election triangle” (see Figure 5):
Although the referendum cannot serve as the foundation of a presidential model that incorporates
midterm election results, it does not necessarily follow that the theory as a whole is unable to
serve as the foundation of a presidential model. This leads to an important question: what factors
from the referendum theory, and possibly any outside factors, deserve consideration when
creating a presidential election model.
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Presidential Model
For this presidential model, none of the variables included reached the appropriate levels of
statistical significance. Now it is time to turn attention to what factors need consideration when
predicting presidential elections. Based on the results from this research, the first factor to
consider when predicting presidential elections is the president’s approval rating. Figure 6
displays the probability an incumbent president or the incumbent party has of retaining the White
House given a certain approval rating.
The graph measures the president’s approval rating in the last Gallup poll prior to the election
against the average predicted probabilities of the president’s reelection chances. For example, a
president with an approval rating of 70% has, according to the graph, a 95% chance of winning
reelection. Contrarily, a president with an approval rating of 34% only has a 12% chance of
winning reelection. In the graph, the inflection point of the graph is located between 45% and
51%. That means somewhere between these two percentages, the incumbent president’s chances
of reelection are 50%. This graph holds true to the idea that presidents with an approval rating
below 50% prior to Election Day will lose reelection. This was the case for Gerald Ford, whose
approval rating was 45% when he lost to Jimmy Carter in 1976. Jimmy Carter’s approval rating
was 37% going into the 1980 election when he lost to Ronald Reagan. George H. W. Bush lost
to Bill Clinton in 1992 with a pre-Election Day approval rating of 34%. The only exception to
this rule is Harry S. Truman in 1948, whose last recorded approval rating before the lost election
was 39%.
Another factor that deserves consideration deals with the issues determining the election.
Sometimes the most important issue is the economy; at other times, foreign policy is the top
issue. For example, in the 1968 presidential election, the deciding issue was the Vietnam War.
The 2004 presidential election focused mainly on the “war on terrorism,” especially in the last
days of campaigning with the release of a video recording of Osama bin Laden the weekend
before the election. Any presidential model needs to include an operationalization of this
variable.
One other factor deserving attention is the off years of the presidential term. Elections work in
the following sequence (see Figure 7):
If it is the case that presidential elections are a referendum on the president’s term in office, then
voters will consider years three and four of the presidential term more than years one and two. If
a presidential model incorporates this idea, then the accuracy of the model will be heading in the
correct direction.
Conclusion
According to the results, it seems as though midterm elections have no bearing on subsequent
presidential elections. This is important because this means that Congress has no coattails for the
president to run on or that the (lack of) decisions made by the Congress have no direct effect on
presidential elections. However, why is it the case Congress has no coattails? Although
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Congress is composed of 535 unique individuals, it is also comprised of 2 distinct political
parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. The political fortunes of the president and the
political fortunes of his fellow party members in Congress should be one-and-the same. The best
indicator for this dynamic is Congress’s approval rating. However, only nine presidential
elections have a recorded Congressional approval rating. As time progresses, I am confident
researchers will be able to determine whether there is a relationship between Congress’s
approval and the president’s reelection.
Jacobson and Kernell (1983) said midterm elections provide an interesting testing ground for
theories regarding voting and elections in the United States. I am in complete agreement with
this statement. As political scientists continue to construct models to predict presidential and
midterm elections, it is my hope that any theory crafted will explain the trends that make
American politics unlike anything else in the world. For example, future studies might take
Tufte’s referendum model, substitute the president’s approval rating for Congress’s approval
rating, and instead of determining changes in the composition of the U.S. House of
Representatives, determine the reelection chances of the incumbent president and incumbent
party.
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FIGURES
The Presidential-Election Surge
high level of information & turnout 

The Midterm-Election Decline
low level of information and turnout 

short-term forces favor the party winning the
presidency

core voters
partisanship: high
turnout: yes
vote choice: some defection to winning
presidential party

no systematic tilt of short-term forces

peripheral voters
partisanship: low
turnout: yes
vote choice: large vote for the winning
presidential party

vote gains for congressional candidates of the party
winning the presidency

peripheral voters
partisanship: low
turnout: no
vote choice: NA


core voters
partisanship: high
turnout: yes
vote choice: vote for their party


vote losses for congressional candidates of the
president’s party

Figure 1. Campbell’s Surge-and-Decline Theory
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public approval of president at
time of midterm election


pre-election shifts in economic
conditions

magnitude of national vote loss
by presient’s party

magnitude of congressional seat
loss by president’s party

Figure 2. Tufte’s Referendum Theory
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Voters
Effects of Short-Term
Presidential Election
Forces

Turnout Effect

Independents
Original Theory

Partisans
Revised Theory

Vote Choice Effect

Revised Theory

Original Theory

Figure 3. Comparison of Original (A. Campbell) and Revised (J. Campbell) Surgeand-Decline Theories in Congressional Elections
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The Presidential-Election Surge
high level of information & turnout 

The Midterm-Election Decline
low level of information and turnout 

short-term forces favor the party winning the
presidency

advantaged partisans (the winning presidential
party)
turnout: higher than usual because of their
popular presidential candidate

no systematic tilt of short-term forces

disadvantaged partisans (the losing presidential
party)
turnout: lower than usual because of crosspressures

disadvantaged partisans (the out party)

independents
vote choice: splits in favor of the winning
presidential party

vote gains for congressional candidates of the party
winning the presidency

independents
vote choice: no systematic tilt toward either
party

vote losses for congressional candidates of the
president’s party


advantaged partisans (the president’s party)
turnout: normal rate

turnout: normal rate

Figure 4. The Revised Theory of the Surge-and-Decline Sequence
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Economy
Midterm
Presidential
Elections Time Elections

Figure 5. Election Triangle
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Figure 6. Probability of an Incumbent President’s Reelection Based on
Approval Rating
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Presidential
Election

Midterm
Election

Figure 7. Election Sequence
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TABLES
Models

Dependent
Variable

Independent Variable

Controls

Type of
Regression

Midterm:
Surge-and-Decline

Number of U.S.
House Seats

Incumbent President’s
Share of Popular Vote

Incumbent
President’s
Political Party

Linear
Regression

Incumbent
President’s
Political Party

Linear
Regression

Incumbent
President’s
Political Party

Logistic
Regression

Midterm:
Referendum

Number of U.S.
House Seats

Presidential

President Was/Was
Not Successfully
Reelected

President’s Approval
Rating Prior to Election;
Percent Change in
Personal Disposable
Income; Consumer
Confidence Index
Number of U.S. House
Seats; Other
Independent Variables

Table 1. Midterm and Presidential Election Models
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